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Perelman’s Theory of Argumentation
and Natural Law
Francis J. Mootz III

Chaïm Perelman resuscitated the rhetorical tradition by developing an
elegant and detailed theory of argumentation. Rejecting the single-minded
Cartesian focus on rational truth, Perelman recovered the ancient wisdom
that we can argue reasonably about matters that admit only of probability. From this one would conclude that Perelman’s argumentation theory
is inalterably opposed to natural law, and therefore that I would have done
better to have written an article titled “Perelman’s Theory of Argumentation
as a Rejection of Natural Law.”
However, my thesis is precisely that Perelman’s theory of argumentation connects to the natural law tradition in interesting and productive ways. Perelman referred to natural law in a number of his essays as
an example of the excessively rational focus that he sought to correct
with his theory of argumentation, but he also noted the power of natural
law claims in legal argumentation. To my knowledge, he never oﬀered
a detailed account of the connections between his theory of argumentation and natural law. However, Perelman’s deep and abiding concern
with justice suggests that he could not help but be interested in lines of
argumentation that challenge positive laws from some other standpoint—
that, in some manner, he must embrace some elements of the natural law
tradition.
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2010
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I wish to outline the ways that a natural law account can ﬁt with
Perelman’s theory of argumentation in order to address an ontological crisis
that grips contemporary legal theory. Steven Smith (2004) has persuasively
described “law’s quandary” now that legal practice purports to be divorced
from the natural law contexts in which it developed. Smith provocatively
contends that there is “at least a strong prima facie case that modern legal
discourse is operating in a sort of ‘ontological gap’ that divides our explicit
or owned ontological commitments (which preclude us from recognizing
the reality of ‘the law’ [that stands distinct from empirical legal practices])
from the ontological assumptions not only implicit in but essential to
our discourse and practice (which seem to presuppose the reality of ‘the
law’)” (1994, 63).1 In a similar vein, Peter Goodrich describes the plight of
contemporary legal theory with concise accuracy, observing that we have
abandoned natural law foundations originally constructed in ecclesiastical
venues only to ﬁnd that the project of developing a secular legal language
capable of transforming the management of social conﬂict into questions
of technical rationality is doomed to failure (1996, 160–61).
I contend that by working through a conception of natural law that ﬁts
with Perelman’s philosophy of argumentation we can ﬁnd a promising way
to address law’s ontological crisis. The philosophy of the new rhetoric is a
rich resource for describing the ontological space in which law operates and
also for providing normative guidance to those engaged in legal practice.

the natural law tradition
The term “natural law” generally calls to mind a philosophical account
that bloomed in ancient Rome, was absorbed into the Christian tradition,
reached full expression in Aquinas, and then was secularized and rationalized as a philosophy of natural rights. Cicero oﬀered a succinct deﬁnition of
pre-Christian natural law based on the Stoic tradition, arguing that natural
law is universal, eternal, and unchanging and that these characteristics of
reality follow from the fact that natural law is authored and administered
by a deity.
True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal
application, unchanging and everlasting. . . . [W]e need not look
outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there
will not be diﬀerent laws at Rome and at Athens, or diﬀerent laws
now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will
384
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be valid for all nations and for all times, and there will be one
master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author
of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. (1928, 3.22.33)
Cicero’s account was easily accommodated to Christian principles that were
embraced and propagated by the Roman Empire. Centuries later, Aquinas
diﬀerentiated eternal law, natural law and positive law, arguing that God’s
divine will is beyond our ken but that we are capable of determining the
conditions under which humans ﬂourish through use of our reason because,
to borrow St. Paul’s words, the natural law has been written in our hearts.2
Following centuries of war and violence waged on behalf of religious
belief, Enlightenment scholars sought to ground the persistent demand for
human rights in univocal reason rather than a religious cosmology. In this
account, human nature gives rise to certain moral precepts rather than a
lawgiving deity; more precisely, the integrity and intrinsic worth of human
life gives rise to a variety of moral dictates. This shift in emphasis is noted in
the term “natural rights,” which a person bears, as opposed to “natural law,”
to which a person is subject.
Most recently, Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Robert P. George
have argued for a “new natural law” that purports to rejuvenate Aquinas’s
approach in terms that are suitable to our secular and rationalist age. Put
simply, they contend that a number of incommensurable human goods
simply are given as elements of human ﬂourishing and that these human
goods provide a determinate basis for ethical decision making through the
exercise of a noncalculative and nonutilitarian practical reasoning.
Theories of natural law reﬂect critical accounts of the constitutive
aspects of the well-being and fulﬁllment of human persons and the communities they form. The propositions that pick out fundamental aspects of
human ﬂourishing are directive (that is, prescriptive) in our thinking about
what to do and what to refrain from doing (our practical reason)—that is,
they are, or provide, more than merely instrumental reasons for action and
self-restraint (George 2007, 55; Finnis 2005).
George emphasizes the chastened character of the “new natural law” by
rejecting the idea that judges may directly access its principles in deciding
cases; rather, positive law always imperfectly implements natural law, and
therefore a commitment to the rule of law is a critical feature of modern
constitutional democracies (2007, 71–75).
This long-standing, but constantly evolving, tradition of natural law
thinking does not easily connect with Perelman’s theory of argumentation
385
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for the simple reason that genuine argumentation plays no role in the
existence or elaboration of this tradition. The positing of an abiding criterion that exists outside of time or place leaves no room for argumentation;
instead, there is simply validity or nonvalidity. Even the “new natural law” is
at odds with Perelman’s philosophy because it presumes that there are correct answers to moral questions—even though people acting in good faith
can disagree about which answer is correct—and also insists that reaching
the correct answer is a matter of reﬁning our abilities to reason practically.
For example, Anthony Lisska accuses Finnis’s “new natural law” of promoting the exercise of theoretical reason in the guise of practical reason
(1996, 156). As I explain, Lisska’s reconstruction of Aquinas’s philosophy
in terms of Aristotelian practical reasoning provides a plausible theoretical
starting point for conceiving natural law in terms of Perelman’s theory of
argumentation.
Given its historical trajectory, it should come as no surprise that
Perelman roundly criticizes natural law. He rejects the secular, rationalist
incarnation of the tradition because it presumes that reason can determine
not only what is true in the world of empirical fact but also what is just in the
social world (1980, 29–32, 42–44, 131). His friend and colleague Mieczyslaw
Maneli argues that the new rhetoric rejects any traditionalist reliance on a
“natural” state of aﬀairs (1986, 361–62). As Perelman notes, the traditional
approach to natural law continually runs aground on the shoals of experience, as demonstrated by the fact that reason has failed to settle debates
regarding justice that reach back at least as far as Sophocles (1980, 165).3
He concludes that justice is not univocal; instead, it always requires making
choices between justiﬁable tenets that are in conﬂict. Law must operate in
the realm of the reasonable as well as the rational if it is to do justice.
However, Perelman’s philosophy also is deeply indebted to Aristotle,
and Perelman recognizes that there may be room for a very diﬀerent understanding of natural law by drawing on Aristotle. In a dictionary entry on
the term, Perelman cautions that combining two polysemic words such
as “nature” and “law” yields myriad deﬁnitions, and so one must think
contextually and historically rather than conceptually (Foriers and Perelman
1974, 13–14). Aristotle oﬀers a counterpoint to modern rationalist conceptions of natural law because he was too wedded to the necessity of an equitable leavening of the law to endorse a thoroughly rationalized approach to
legal practice. In response to a question at a seminar, Perelman criticized
the alignment of natural law with the “rational”—regarded in terms of the
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mathematical model of moral reasoning—but he emphasized that there
was a line of thinking from Aristotle to Aquinas that embraced a more
ﬂexible account. “I don’t see either Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas saying as
Grotius says, that there are eternal laws of justice, just as eternal as the laws
of mathematics. It is impossible” (1979a, 221). As Jan Broekman summarizes,
“Natural law and positive law are both historical and subject to change. It
is precisely this dimension that deﬁnes the inquiry of Perelman” (1986, 383).
This gesture by Perelman toward the classical understanding of natural law
as a feature of the interplay between the hypothesized rational legal system
and the reasonable resolution of speciﬁc cases provides the starting point
for my inquiry.
I use the term “natural law” generally to refer to the tradition of natural
law thinking, but in this article I propose a new understanding of natural
law. The term “natural law” combines two elements: nature and law. I argue
that the “nature” under consideration is human nature—more speciﬁcally,
our nature as ﬁnite, hermeneutical, and rhetorical beings. The “law” to
which I refer is not given in the natural world nor promulgated by a deity;
rather, it is the social activity of legal regulation. I conclude that “natural
law” is best understood as a “naturalized rhetoric,” by which I mean that
the manner in which we engage in legal regulation is rooted in our interpretive and rhetorical nature. Deﬁned in this manner, natural law ﬁts with
Perelman’s theory of argumentation, although it is necessary to draw these
connections very carefully.

perelman’s theory of argumentation and natural law
There are at least three diﬀerent ways to think about natural law in conjunction with Perelman’s theory of argumentation. First, we can regard natural
law as a line of argument, a related family of commonplaces that we ﬁnd
impossible to ignore, despite our overt positivist commitments. Second,
we might connect Perelman’s contested (and often misunderstood) idea of
a “universal audience” to the natural law tradition. Finally, and most radically, we might think of natural law in more far-reaching theoretical terms
by conceiving Perelman’s philosophy as propounding a “naturalized rhetoric.” By connecting with the natural law tradition in these multiple ways,
Perelman’s theory of argumentation demonstrates robust aﬃnities with
natural law. In this short article I can only adumbrate these three lines
of inquiry.

387
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Natural Law as a Commonplace
Perelman recognized that natural law plays an important role in legal
argumentation, even if we reject the claim that there is an objective structure of justice that can be understood through the use of reason:
The idea of natural law is also misconceived when it is posed in
ontological terms. . . . Natural law is better considered as a body of
general principles or loci, consisting of ideas such as “the nature of
things,” “the rule of law,” and of rules such as “No one is expected
to perform impossibilities,” “both sides should be heard”—all of
which are capable of being applied in diﬀerent ways. It is the task
of the legislator or judge to decide which of the not unreasonable
solutions should become a rule of positive law. Such a view, according to Michel Villey, corresponds to the idea of natural law found
in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas—what he calls the classical
natural law. (1979b, 33–34)
The dialectic of the reasonable and the rational in law shows the need for
a more ﬂexible understanding of natural law as something other than a
rational construct that is timeless and universal (Perelman 1979b, 120–22).
Perelman’s analysis of the natural law tradition as a collection of commonplaces exempliﬁes how rhetorical exchanges working from commonplaces contain a critical bite. He cites the decision by the Allies to justify
the Nuremberg trials with appeals to natural law as a concession to the fact
that the demands of justice exceed the capacity of positive law (1979b, 104).
Even if the history of natural law thought is marked by authoritarian and
ideological overtones, Perelman does not regard the tradition as a “mistake”
that should—or can—be exorcized from our vocabulary. He eﬀectively strips
natural law precepts of their inauthentic claims to eternal and universal
validity and urges legal theorists and practitioners to utilize the principles
as vital (indeed, unavoidable) resources for introducing innovation and for
critiquing existing legal relations.
Perelman’s approach recalls Aristotle’s advice about how to argue
against application of a written law that is against one’s interest when it
is read literally rather than in an eﬀort to eﬀectuate the purpose of the
law. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle recommends arguing that following the written law slavishly would do an injustice, quoting Antigone’s pleas as a basis
for this line of argument. He suggests one should argue this point ﬁrst by
388
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observing that “it is evident that if the written law is contrary to the facts,
one must use common law and arguments based on fairness as being more
just.” Next, he says, one should point out that “to use ‘best understanding’ is
not to follow the written law exclusively” and “that fairness always remains
and never changes nor does the common law (for it is in accordance with
nature) but written laws often change” (1991, 110). Aristotle emphasizes that
the advocate should argue that not all written laws are just, and so the person seeking justice should conform to the unwritten law (1991, 66–74).
Tony Burns (2002) explains why Aristotle includes this line of argumentation in the Rhetoric. First, Burns argues that Aristotle miscasts
Sophocles as a defender of a universal and eternal natural law. It is more
likely that Antigone is appealing to tradition-bound and parochial religious
custom rather than invoking abstract and eternal principles. In other words,
Antigone invokes a premodern natural law argument that too often is lost
in our rationalist readings of Aristotle, providing additional support for the
idea that the “natural law” is a confused concept that has been invoked as
part of arguments within diﬀering contexts over the millennia.
More important, Burns contends that Aristotle did not endorse this
line of argument, although by including it in the Rhetoric he acknowledged
that these types of argument—most vividly advanced by sophistic challenges to slavery as an “unnatural” practice—had found currency among his
contemporaries (2003, 28–35).4 To the extent that Aristotle eventually did
endorse natural law arguments, Burns contends that he did so in order to
justify the status quo against radical attacks (2003, 34–35). Burns explains:
Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of natural justice or law . . . in
the Nicomachean Ethics, in striking contrast to what he says about
natural law arguments in the Rhetoric, might be seen as a classic
illustration of such a rhetorical manoeuvre. The irony of Aristotle’s
suggestion that it is his radical political opponents such as Alcidimas
who employ the concept of natural law in a merely rhetorical manner whereas he himself employs the same concept in the pursuit
of objective ethical truth is readily apparent—especially (but not
only) to those of a Nietzschean or poststructuralist philosophical
persuasion. (2003, 35)
Natural law has a complex valence in Aristotle’s usage, but Perelman
would certainly conclude that these diﬀerent uses of natural law by
Aristotle follow from the fact that it is an essentially contested concept
389
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that is closely connected to justice. If natural law is an ontological feature
of the world, it must be the case that when both parties in a debate invoke
natural law one of them must be wrong. However, when natural law is
understood as a commonplace from which one may argue many points
in diﬀerent ways, one must regard it as a supple and polysemic concept
that does not yield singular answers to social and legal disputes. Even the
highly rationalistic notions of natural rights that arose in the Enlightenment period can be viewed as lines of critical argumentation against the
status quo that proved to be incredibly productive rhetorical strategies even
though they lacked the certainty an ontological backing could provide. As
Michel Foucault reminds us, critique might be seen as “the art of not being
governed quite so much,” and he highlights the historical emergence of
natural law arguments in favor of human rights as one of three historical
points in the emergence of critique as an element of the Enlightenment
(2007, 45). Natural law can be seen as an ideological commitment to the
status quo or as liberating critique, which is precisely its importance as a
line of argumentation.
Lawyers encounter examples of the polysemic character of commonplaces on a daily basis; this is the source of the energy and innovation of
legal argumentation. Consider the issues raised by the collection of policies
and practices known collectively as “aﬃrmative action.” The law is quite
clear that states may not deny to any citizen equal protection under the
law. But what does this commonplace mean in the context of determining
which employees will be promoted in a certain workplace? Does equality
mean subjecting every employee to the exact same testing criteria, or does
it mean assessing the merits of each individual employee to perform the job
functions while also attending to the eﬀects of past discrimination on certain employees’ ability to compete according to supposed neutral criteria?
It is a curious, but not altogether uncommon, feature of legal practice that
opposing sides in a contentious legal dispute can appeal to the same legal
principles and rules in support of their respective positions. These localized
doctrinal disputes reﬂect the same dynamic that has been at work in the use
of natural law arguments since the dawn of Western civilization.
Natural Law as the Construction of a Universal Legal Audience
Perelman’s development of the ancient attention to audience is one of his
signature contributions to rhetorical theory. Noting that the audience envisioned by the speaker “is always a more or less systematized construction,”
390
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Perelman places emphasis on the speaker’s goal of creating her audience
in the course of addressing it (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 19).
In some circumstances, a speaker will aspire to more than persuading the
audience to which the speech is immediately directed and will claim to
oﬀer reasons that would be convincing to all reasonable persons. “This
refers of course, in this case, not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a
universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of
an audience which should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we
need not take into consideration those [who] are not part of it” (Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31). Speakers construct a universal audience
not only to shape their discourse but also to entreat the concrete audience
before them—which “can never amount to more than ﬂoating incarnations
of this universal audience” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31)—to
imagine themselves as part of such an audience. As Perelman emphasizes,
the actual audience helps to validate the speaker’s construction of the universal audience, even as the universal audience serves as a check on the
parochial concerns of the actual audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
1969, 35).
All lines of argumentation are shaped to the audience to which they
are addressed, and natural law arguments are no diﬀerent. I believe that it
makes good sense to regard natural law arguments as addressing a particular audience in their capacity as a contingent example of a hypothesized
universal audience. When some sophists argued that slavery was an aﬀ ront
to the natural dignity and equality of all men they appealed to a speciﬁc
Greek audience rooted in customary practices of slavery, but they sought to
provoke this audience to recognize its membership in a broader universal
audience. Arguing that slavery is a violation of universal norms that are part
of the structure of reality does not call for an investigation of the natural
world; rather, it calls for a reconﬁguration of the self-understanding of the
audience.
As a lawyer and law professor, I have no doubt that natural law arguments (even if not expressly characterized as such) are ubiquitous and perhaps unavoidable in legal practice. If we agree with Perelman that there is
no abiding structure of reality that grounds these arguments ontologically,
we must seek to understand them by exploring the character of the audience that the legal orator seeks to construct and the manner by which the
orator seeks to motivate an actual audience to act in response to them.
I regard it as impossible to carry out this task without employing a conception of the universal audience, which suggests that the notion of the
391
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universal audience is critical to Perelman’s philosophical clariﬁcation of
legal argumentation, a practice that he regarded as exemplary for moral
argumentation (1980, 114–19, 146, 174). This leads me to conclude that the
idea of natural law claims as commonplaces that seek resonance with an
audience inspired to reconstitute itself as the universal audience resides at
the center of Perelman’s theory of argumentation and is not just an obscure
detail in Perelman scholarship.
By exploring natural law arguments made within the context of the
legal system we can avoid some of the many misunderstandings that have
arisen from Perelman’s use of the term “universal audience” to refer to a
hypothesized audience of all reasonable persons to whom a philosophical
claim to truth is addressed. A natural law argument is directed to a universal
audience for whom the actual audience—whether a jury, judge, or appellate panel—serves as a stand-in. But this is not to say that the audience is
hypothesized to be generically “rational” or “philosophical.” Claims in this
setting are peculiarly legal in nature and are best paraphrased as “No reasonable person seeking to implement the values of our legal system could
conclude that slavery is legitimate, notwithstanding our custom and written
laws to the contrary.” Arguments traditionally couched in natural law terms
are not arguments made to a timeless and decontextualized rational being;
rather, these arguments are designed to provoke the actual audience to rise
above their parochial interests and to conceive of themselves as empowered
to articulate truth, justice, and other confused notions in a manner that all
members of the community should ﬁnd persuasive. Using the terminology
of contemporary rhetorical criticism, we can say that natural law arguments
address a particular audience of intended readers with the goal of invoking
an idealized (universal) audience (see Selzer 1992).
Trial lawyers emphasize the importance of developing a “theory of the
case,” which is to say that they try to construct a narrative that the jury
will endorse as its own recounting of what happened and what should be
done. The “theory of the case” is in fact a factual narrative rather than a
theoretical construct. The goal is to persuade the jury that justice demands
a verdict in favor of one’s client; literally, the facts are presented so that
they appear to speak for themselves. Perhaps the most famous, and most
mimicked, theory of the case was oﬀered by veteran trial lawyer Johnnie
Cochran in his defense of O. J. Simpson for the murder of his ex-wife
and her companion. Although the rhyming cadence of “If it doesn’t ﬁt,
you must acquit” provoked laughs when repeated by late-night comedians,
Cochran employed a powerful rhetorical device to summon the jury to
392
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assume its role as the guarantors of justice. The evidence against Simpson
was powerful and comprehensive, and yet the prosecution’s case was ﬁlled
with various holes, inconsistencies, and gaﬀes. Cochran’s theory of the case
was simple: despite overwhelming forensic evidence, the government’s
actions and representations evidenced a malicious, or at least incompetent, approach to the prosecution that should not be tolerated by a jury
empaneled to do justice.
We can see in the everyday practice of trial lawyers the rhetorical call for
a speciﬁc audience to act as a universal audience. The entire trial process is
suﬀused with procedural elements that permit the competing rhetors—the
opposed lawyers—to construct the audience they will address in the closing
argument. From jury selection, to the narrative drama of the presentation
of the evidence, to the formulation of jury charges, and through the closing
arguments, the trial is a sustained eﬀort to construct the jury in such a way
that it assumes its role as an incarnation of the universal audience that rises
above the immediacy of the individual concerns of the jurors. In A Theory
of the Trial, Robert Burns argues that a trial structures competing linguistic
practices and performances to enable the trier to make practical judgments
about what is to be done in response to complex and competing accounts
of facts and norms (1999). This leads Burns to characterize judgment as
the “strife” of competing claims to truth (1999, 181–82). The advocates call
on the jury to act as a universal audience capable of working through this
unavoidable strife in reasonable fashion.
The jury responds to the competing narratives ﬁrst by determining the
important issues at stake and then by resolving them in a practical manner that reaﬃrms the integrity of both general principles and the speciﬁc
factual circumstances. Burns concludes:
I have argued that a great advantage of the contemporary trial
is its internal complexity, comprising empirical, moral, political,
and strictly “legal” language and values. It is suﬃciently ﬂexible
to allow, indeed to require, that the jury determine what the most
important aspect of the case is. . . .
. . . The trial’s constitutive rules and practices allow for delicate
choices about the inevitable metalevel questions woven into the trial’s diﬀerent linguistic practices. If these incommensurable spheres
exhaust our social perspectives, if there is no Platonic perspective
from which one might determine which sphere is ultimately dominant, from which (partial) perspective ought the jury to decide
393
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which perspective is the right one? The answer seems to me clear.
The jury decides the metalevel questions from the perspective of
commonsense morality, rigorously applied, criticized, and sometimes challenged by the devices of the trial. The existence of such a
forum is a challenge to any form of social ordering that cannot justify its distinctive principles in the language of ordinary morality.
(1999, 239, 244)
The theory of the case, the artful construction of past factual events during
the trial, is more than a base appeal to individual jurors to display their moralistic biases. The jurors are challenged to act in concert, after deliberation,
to repair a breach of social ties. Sitting in judgment over the strife of incommensurable claims, they collectively act as a transitory incarnation of the
universal audience.
Naturalizing Rhetoric
There is a ﬁnal, and more radical, sense in which we can connect natural law
with Perelman’s theory of argumentation. I term this approach, “naturalizing rhetoric.” This is a potentially misleading term, and so I want to unpack
my meaning carefully. As used in contemporary philosophical discourse,
“naturalism” refers generally to a philosophy that sees itself as clarifying the
empirical dimensions of reality rather than engaging in speculative metaphysics. The assumption is that nature is just empirical reality, subject to
scientiﬁc investigation as supplemented by philosophical reﬂection. I use
the term “naturalized rhetoric” as a provocation to challenge this prejudice:
we “naturalize” rhetoric when we regard human “nature” as a deeply rhetorical condition. Simply put, it is our persistent human condition to continuously recreate ourselves and our society through rhetorical exchanges with
others. A naturalized rhetoric embraces the paradox that nonessentialism
is essential to our being, that we can ﬁnd a foundation for reﬂection in
antifoundationalism.5
A naturalized rhetoric has both explanatory and normative force. On
the one hand, a naturalized rhetoric underwrites Perelman’s theory of argumentation by emphasizing that it is an aﬃrmative account of our nature
as reasoning beings rather than a reluctant concession to the limitations of
our rational capacity. Perelman is less vigorous in his critique of Cartesian
rationalism than Vico, who argued against the incipient rationalism of the
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Western tradition by defending the priority of rhetoric and its connections
to our imaginative capacities and the metaphoric structure of human
understanding (Mootz 2008b; Mootz 2009). By naturalizing rhetoric in the
humanist tradition exempliﬁed by Vico we can elaborate the ontological
claims that subtend Perelman’s theory of argumentation.
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics performs the necessary task of providing an ontological grounding of Perelman’s rhetorical
philosophy in a manner that connects with Vico’s more radical rhetorical
insights. The centerpiece of Gadamer’s account of the nature of human
understanding is the metaphor of a conversation that yields an ongoing—
which is to say a never completed—fusion of horizons. If our nature is deeply
hermeneutical, it is also deeply rhetorical. We engage others rhetorically;
we experience this engagement hermeneutically. Gadamer provides guidance in the face of “Cartesian anxiety” by providing an ontological account
of the social nature of understanding (Bineham 1995). Perelman’s description of rhetorical moves can be misinterpreted as a relativistic response
to the Cartesian model of knowledge, but Gadamer’s ontological account
grounds Perelman’s rhetorical philosophy in a way that prevents this misreading (Mootz 2006, 30–32). In other words, Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics ensures that we appreciate Perelman’s work as a description
of the human condition, not as a handbook of argumentative strategies.
Important normative implications follow from a naturalized rhetoric.
If it is our nature to be rhetorical, an ethical system oriented toward promoting human ﬂourishing would require that we ensure the social and legal
context for the development of this capacity. This recognition would not
lead to speciﬁc policy prescriptions nor provide deﬁnitive answers to speciﬁc legal dilemmas, but it would generally point us in the direction of
maximizing human communication and exchange. Moreover, a naturalized
rhetoric suggests a basis from which we might approach one of the central
questions in rhetorical theory—whether there is a basis for distinguishing
“good” rhetoric from “bad” rhetoric—in a more productive manner.
Jeﬀ rey Maciejewski (2005, 2006) makes just this claim by connecting
the basic good of social life to the natural fact that rhetoric is necessary to
fashion a community. Although overly wedded to nonrhetorical features
of Aquinas’s natural law philosophy, Maciejewski aligns himself with the
notion of an evolving human nature that is rhetorically secured in social
intercourse. He properly concludes that there is a natural rhetoric essential
to the development of the person.
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When examined more acutely using a moral theory attuned to
human behavior such as natural law, it seems that declaring persuasion immoral as a violation of autonomy belies the human
penchant for employing rhetoric as part of living in society. As
rhetoric services reason, which in turn services the dispositions, it
can be seen as a natural, morally praiseworthy concomitant of the
exercising of reason which helps to reveal the potentiality of reason
itself. Moreover, I believe it possible to refer to such rhetoric as
“natural.” (2005, 256)
However, when exploring these themes it is crucial to avoid the temptation to essentialize our rhetorical nature by supposing that it includes more
substantive agreement on shared norms than can be secured in dialogue
and argumentation. In other words, it is always illegitimate to recognize
our rhetorical nature but then to prescribe certain “natural law” claims that
must be accepted by all rational persons and that therefore can be coercively
imposed.
Perelman’s cautions about the dangers of invoking the universal audience speak to these potential abuses of natural law claims. Perelman warns
of the danger of elitism that results in characterizing dissenters as irrational
or heretics or that leads the speaker to constrict the actual audience to a
small vanguard that already agrees with the claims put forward (Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 33–34). These ideological tendencies are closely
associated with natural law argumentation through the ages, but it is precisely by naturalizing rhetoric that we have the best chance of avoiding this
misuse of natural law commonplaces. By recognizing that it is our nature to
be rhetorical, and that the variety of legal systems rest on this naturalized
rhetoric rather than on an objective state of aﬀairs that can be discerned by
reason alone, we can understand how natural law argumentation works to
construct a universal audience through rhetorical means.
I am not writing on a completely blank slate in legal theory to suggest
this reading of the natural law tradition. Even the resolute analytical legal
positivist, H. L. A. Hart, concedes that it made sense to acknowledge that
there is a minimal natural law requirement that shapes a legal system in
light of our human nature and the bare need for survival (1994, 193–200).
Hart argues that the nature of human existence—our vulnerability to each
other, our approximate equality in endowments, and our not being either
wholly altruistic or evil—provides the context in which certain sociolegal conditions must be present to permit survival. Hart suggests that this
recognition shows a way to do justice to both the natural law and positive
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law traditions: “We shall no longer have to choose between two unsuitable
alternatives which are often taken as exhaustive: on the one hand, that of
saying that this is required by ‘the’ meaning of the words ‘law’ or ‘legal
system,’ and on the other, that of saying that it is ‘just a fact’ that most legal
systems do provide for sanctions” (1994, 199).
Rather than debating whether sanctions are an essential feature of the
concept of legality, Hart suggests that we are better served by regarding
them as a “natural necessity” in light of the human condition. Needless to
say, this concession has sparked spirited debate.6
There are several productive points of reference in recent legal theory
that develop alternative accounts of natural law in a manner congenial to
my thesis. In contrast to Hart’s minimal concession, Lon Fuller argued that
moral commitments generated in communicative exchange extend beyond,
and sometimes override, the biologically driven struggle to survive (1969,
184–86). In his ﬁnal response to the criticisms of his proceduralist approach
to natural law, Fuller revealed that he was a genuine natural law theorist.
Elsewhere I have argued that these brief and overlooked remarks reveal
that Fuller is best understood as a proponent of the style of natural law
that resonates with Perelman’s rhetorical philosophy (1999, 338–45). Fuller’s
dramatic ﬁnal plea on behalf of natural law calls for what I have termed a
naturalized rhetoric: “If I were asked, then, to discern one central indisputable principle of what may be called substantive natural law—Natural
Law with capital letters—I would ﬁnd it in the injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which
men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire” (1969, 186).
More recently, Lloyd Weinreb (1987, 1994) has moved beyond Fuller’s tentative suggestion and argued in favor of natural law understood as the eﬀort
to work out the normative kosmos in which we ﬁnd ourselves as creative
participants.
The work by Fuller and Weinreb provides excellent starting points
in legal theory for understanding the concept of a naturalized rhetoric as
a productive development of the natural law tradition. Fuller paid scant
attention to these dimensions of his work, providing only a gesture at the
end of his career toward this type of analysis. Weinreb has more thoroughly
embraced nomos as the ground of natural law, thereby bringing himself
within the rhetorical tradition defended by Vico and revived by Perelman.
However, Weinreb’s approach is on the fringe of American jurisprudential writing; his singular voice has not resonated in a positivist era during
which the natural law tradition has waned into virtual irrelevance. Reading
Perelman’s philosophy as a naturalized rhetoric provides vital context and
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backing for Weinreb’s work, permitting more detailed elaborations of the
hermeneutical-rhetorical character of legal practice.

conclusion
We can make signiﬁcant headway in providing a practical and theoretical
response to the ontological quandary facing contemporary legal theory if we
reconsider the natural law tradition by connecting it to Perelman’s theory
of argumentation in the three ways that I have described. Steven Smith’s
incisive description of law’s quandary paralyzes the reader by oﬀering an
either-or proposition: either “the Law” refers to something outside legal
practice that can direct it, or it is just a nonsensical reference that exposes
an ontological gap in which our discourse operates. These unsatisfactory
alternatives obscure the fact that the rhetorical appeal to “the Law” is not
an appeal to something that exists outside the practice of law. By attending
more carefully to legal practice we can explain and justify our references to
“the Law” as part of the rhetorical elements of legal practice. Legal practice
has historical and normative depth that always vastly exceeds any particular
legal argument.
Consider the situation facing lawyers who are litigating a case of ﬁrst
impression regarding enterprise liability for drug manufacturers when the
maker of the drug that was ingested by the plaintiﬀ cannot be determined.
Lawyers from both sides will argue strenuously that the law requires a verdict in favor of their client, which means that there is an appeal to something beyond the equities attendant to the particular case before them. The
“beyond,” however, just is the historical trajectory of the ongoing practice
brought to bear on the case before the parties. Lawyers cannot generate a
uniquely correct result for the case at hand by means of dialectical reasoning (despite the rhetorical conventions of legal argumentation that purport
to accomplish this impossible feat), but in their appeals to the legal tradition they can generate plausible arguments for a rhetorical elaboration of
what “the Law” requires in the case at hand.
In Perelman’s account, “the Law” is best conceptualized as a set of commonplaces from which one can draw in making an argument in a particular
case and by which one invokes a universal audience that is competent to do
justice (1980). The topoi that form “the Law” are real and provide guidance,
even if they cannot resolve speciﬁc legal disputes deﬁnitively. Referring to
“the Law” is just to make a general reference to the topoi from which one
can argue for a speciﬁc result; consequently, “the Law” is neither empty nor
a means of answering legal questions from the “outside.”
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We invoke “the Law” as a call for a response from the audience. The call
asks the audience to respond by assuming the role of an idealized audience
that is competent to do justice. The ubiquitous commonplaces of natural
law argumentation in contemporary legal practice are not simply moves
within the logic of doctrinal elaboration; rather, these commonplaces are
focused on shaping the audience’s self-understanding. Natural law commonplaces serve an epideictic role as much as a forensic or logical role, and
Perelman grasped the signiﬁcance of this role in his much misunderstood,
and much maligned, notion of the universal audience.
Finally, the activity of appealing to “the Law” is a feature of our nature
as hermeneutical and rhetorical beings, a nature that we can explore by
pursuing a naturalized rhetoric. Perelman does not simply catalogue arguments that may be deployed in rhetorical situations; he provides a window
to human nature. Perelman is best read as pursuing a naturalized rhetoric,
and from this understanding important implications for the natural law tradition follow. By reading Perelman in this more radical manner we not only
recognize the full scope of his ingenuity and originality but also make headway in one of the most important debates in political and legal philosophy.
Smith has argued that law is in a metaphysical quandary, separated from
its natural law roots with no viable substitute to sustain legal legitimacy.
With Perelman’s guidance, we ﬁnd a natural law solution to law’s quandary
in the account oﬀered by contemporary rhetorical philosophy, even if it is
very diﬀerent from the traditional natural law accounts that shape Smith’s
anticipation of a suitable resolution of the quandary. Perelman’s theory of
argumentation provides a way to resuscitate natural law theorizing while
at the same time moving ﬁrmly beyond the false certainties that Perelman
knew only impede our quest for justice.
William S. Boyd School of Law
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

notes
An earlier version of this article was presented at “The Promise of Reason,” convened at
the University of Oregon in May 2008. I thank Jim Crosswhite, David Frank, and John
Gage for putting together an excellent conference and for inviting me to attend. I extend
special thanks to Jim Crosswhite for organizing this symposium and for providing such
helpful feedback to me as I developed my talk into an article. I dedicate this article to
Jan M. Broekman, dean emeritus of the Faculty of Law at the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, Belgium, and distinguished visiting professor at Penn State’s Dickinson School
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of Law, in gratitude for a vibrant intellectual exchange whose mark extends well beyond
this paper and for a warm, personal friendship. Professor Broekman does not necessarily
endorse my theme—in fact, he remains quite skeptical about the utility of natural law—
nor is he to blame for the deﬁciencies that remain in my argument.
1. I have reviewed Smith’s book in some detail elsewhere (Mootz 2008a).
2. In his letter to the Romans, St. Paul writes: “For when Gentiles who do not have
the Law do instinctively the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law unto
themselves, in that they show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience
bearing witness and their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them, on the day
when, according to my gospel, God will judge the secrets of men through Jesus Christ”
(New American Standard Bible 1995, Romans 2:14–16).
3. Robert George concedes that the truths of natural law often are obscured by socially
constructed ideologies, as when southerners in the antebellum American South defended
slavery (2007, 62). Hence, his conclusion: “So, if there is a set of moral norms, including
norms of justice and human rights, that can be known by rational inquiry, understanding,
and judgment even apart from any special revelation, then these norms of natural law can
provide the basis for an international regime of human rights. Of course, we should not
expect consensus” (2007, 64).
4. Burns challenges the conventional attribution to the sophists of radically relativist
beliefs, concluding that “at least some of the sophists were not relativists but objectivists
so far as questions of ethics are concerned” and that “the critical attitude of this group of
thinkers towards the institution of slavery indicates the presence in ﬁfth-century Athens
of a universalist, cosmopolitan, rationalist and humanitarian approach to questions of
ethics and politics” (Burns 2003, 25, 26). The primary example is Alcidimas,
who maintained that the institution of slavery contradicts rather than conforms
to the principle of equity, which is the most fundamental principal of natural
justice. This principle states that those who are equal ought to be treated equally
in relevantly similar circumstances. The diﬀerence between Alcidimas and
Aristotle is that Alcidimas took the view that all human beings are by nature
equal, and therefore that slavery is ethically unjustiﬁable, whereas Aristotle did
not. (2002, 550)
5. Naturalizing rhetoric does not rest on theological commitments, but neither is it
necessarily at odds with religious belief. John Macquarrie contends that a viable account
of natural law can serve as a bridge between faith and morality if it “takes account of the
change and development which . . . are characteristic not only of man’s images of himself
but of his very nature and of the world around him” (1991, 232). Macquarrie explains:
But if we acknowledge . . . that man’s nature is open, and that he is always
going beyond or transcending any given state of himself; and if we acknowledge
further that this open nature of man is set in the midst of a cosmos which is
likewise on the move and is characterized by an evolving rather than a static
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order; then we must say that the natural law itself, not just its formulations, is
on the move and cannot have the immutability once ascribed to it. But what has
perhaps more than anything else discredited the natural law concept is the tacit
assumption that there was a kind of original human nature to which everything
subsequent is an accretion. . . . Man’s very nature is to exist, that is to say, to go
out of himself, and in the course of this he learns to take over from crude nature
and to do in a human (and humane) way what was once accomplished by blind
natural forces (both in man and outside of him) working in a rough and ready
manner. (1991, 241)
My notion of a naturalized rhetoric would be one manner of dealing with the dynamic
reality of man’s nature and could be accommodated to religious belief, as Macquarrie suggests, without being dependent on any such belief.
6. Richard Epstein (2005) has argued that we ought to inﬂate Hart’s “natural necessity” to a more robust, yet still libertarian, notion of human welfare. In response, James
Allan (2007) argues that it is a mistake to expand Hart’s minimalist approach.
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